A good doctor will not simply make a diagnosis based on measurements. The symptoms and complaints expressed by the patient are at least as important in making a determination as the data provided by diagnostic tools. When the data says one thing and the symptoms continuously say another, it makes sense to question the reliability of the instruments. This would be particularly true if the instruments are furnished by a party with a stake in a favorable diagnosis, say an insurance company on the hook for treatment costs. The same holds true for the U.S. economy. Although our government-supplied data suggests we are experiencing low inflation and modest economic growth, the economy shows symptoms of low growth, rising prices, and diminishing purchasing power.
In my latest commentary I discussed how the Big Mac Index (The Economist Magazine's 30 year data set on Big Mac prices) provided strong anecdotal evidence that inflation in the United States is higher than official figures. More information has come in since then that tells me the same thing: that Americans are downsizing their lives as their incomes fail to keep pace with rising prices. These symptoms are at odds with the widespread belief in an accelerating recovery that has resulted in braggadocio in Washington and euphoria on Wall Street.
Earlier this week Tyson Foods, one of the nation's largest providers of packaged meat products, announced that although their top line sales revenue increased by almost 2% (roughly in line with U.S. GDP growth), operating margins collapsed by almost 50%, leading to a 43% decline in profit. Consumer shifts away from relatively higher priced/higher margin beef and pork products to lower cost/lower margin chicken products were to blame. Tyson also noted that cost conscious consumers shifted away from higher margin packaged chicken products to fresh meat cuts, thereby sacrificing convenience for cost.
According to government statisticians, the Tyson announcement would reveal modest growth and low inflation. After all, revenue at the company grew and spending on their products had increased modestly. But rising prices were obscured by consumers purchasing lower quality products. Not only are consumers avoiding the beef and pork that they otherwise may have preferred, but they are opting out of the convenience of prepared foods. This behavior is symptomatic of diminished consumer purchasing power. This is known as getting poorer.
The trend corresponds with the steady increase in the share of income that Americans devote to food and energy. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis data, in 2002 Americans spent about 17.8% of income on food and energy. In the first quarter of 2013 the share had risen by a factor of 20% to 21.3% of income. Increased share of spending on necessities like food and energy is consistent with falling living standards. In the poorest countries almost all of income is devoted to such things.
This week we also learned the seemingly positive news that the March trade deficit narrowed to $38.8 billion. But the reduction didn't come from increased exports (which actually declined), but by the sharpest drop in imports since February 2009. Oil imports declined to a seventeen-year low, in part due to rising domestic production, but also due to a record low in 13 years in gasoline consumption. While some may argue that is a function of greater energy efficiency, I believe it's more likely that usage is down because of high prices and high unemployment. Even more significant is that our trade deficit with China in March dropped by a whopping 23.6%, hitting a three-year low. On a year over year basis, the decline in our deficit with China was 90% attributable to the decline in imports.
In contrast to the declining import figures, the government reported that personal spending rose by .2% in March. If we are buying less stuff from abroad, where are Americans spending the extra money? If the prices are stable, and imports are way down, consumer spending should also be down and savings should be up. But the savings rate in March held steady at a meager 2.7%. The sad truth is that Americans are buying fewer Chinese products because they are spending more money on food, rent, utilities, healthcare, insurance, and other necessities that can't be imported. Again, this is consistent with a falling standard of living, as inflation forces consumers to forgo the things they want in order to buy the things that they need.
It was also announced this week that the big three airlines (United, Delta, and American) will be raising their "change fees" for booked tickets by 33%, from $150 to $200. However, it's unlikely that such a hike will make much of an impact on CPI. According to the CPI, airline fares in the United States increased only .3% from 2011 to 2012. This mild increase came at a time when airlines were rolling out more new fees than most air travelers could have possibly imagined.
But even if the government fully factored in the increase in fees, they would likely ignore the change in behavior that the increase would elicit. With the cost of changing a ticket so dramatically higher than it has been in the past, it is likely that far fewer Americans would be willing to change their travel plans once their tickets have been purchased. So even while the spending increase may be relatively small, the lost convenience is not factored into the equation. A ticket with low price (or no price) change option is a much better product than a ticket with high penalties.
CPI reports that from 2007 to 2012 air travel increased on average 4% per year. But that's only half the story. A new study released by MIT reports that during those five years, U.S. airlines cut the number of domestic flights by 14%,with the cuts falling most heavily on mid-sized regional airports. By 2012, the industry also closed more than 20 smaller airports, began using a higher percentage of larger airplanes, and reported record crowding on remaining flights. In other words, air travel not only became more expensive but less convenient and more crowded.
How much loss in value does this inconvenience and lack of flexibility create? It's hard to say, but we all have experienced it with varying degrees of frustration. But what is sure is that the government isn't interested in such trivialities.
The combination of these symptoms suggests that the extent to which people are being impoverished by accelerating inflation is not reflected in official government measurements. This explains why unemployment remains high even as GDP appears to rise. It is my belief that the unprecedented expansion of the money supply under the current Fed leadership is pushing up prices for stocks, bonds, real estate, and consumer goods. Market indices neatly capture the price increases for all of these categories except for the latter, which has been concealed by an overly adjusted CPI.
If consumer inflation data were reported more accurately, it would be revealed that much of the apparent growth is an illusion. The patient is getting sicker, but the doctors are too distracted to notice.
Peter Schiff is the CEO and Chief Global Strategist of Euro Pacific Capital, best-selling author and host of syndicated Peter Schiff Show.
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Don Draper, Mad Men's master advertiser likes to say "when you don't like what they are saying, change the conversation." When it comes to the current economic weakness, which was confirmed again today by the release of lower than expected GDP data, Washington would love do just that. Fortunately for them, they consistently outdo the master minds of Madison Avenue when it comes to misdirection. If the government doesn't like what people are saying, they don't bother just to change the conversation, they change the meaning of the words.
The latest example of this was revealed earlier this week when the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) announced new methods of calculating Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that will immediately make the economy "bigger' than it used to be. The changes focus heavily on how money spent on research and development (R&D) and the production of "intangible" assets like movies, music, and television programs will be accounted for. Declaring such expenditures to be "investments" will immediately increase U.S. GDP by about three percent. Such an upgrade would immediately increase the theoretic size of the U.S economy and may well lead to the perception of faster growth. In reality these smoke and mirror alterations are no different from changes made to the inflation and unemployment yardsticks that for years have convinced Americans that the economy is better than it actually is.
Today's data release confirms that the economic "recovery" is weaker than expected and remains heavily dependent on Federal support. Personal spending was indeed up 3.2%, the biggest jump in two years, but real earnings were down by 5.3%, the biggest fall since 2009. Not surprisingly the buying was made possible by a drop in the savings rate, which came in at just 2.6%, the lowest since the 4th quarter of 2007. No doubt, rising home prices and falling mortgage rates (made possible by Fed stimulus) allowed Americans to refinance their homes and to borrow and spend the money that they did not earn. With GDP continuing to disappoint, a statistical make-over couldn't come at a more convenient time.
In the simplest terms, GDP is calculated by combining a nation's private spending, government spending, and investments (while adding trade surplus or subtracting trade deficits). Business spending on R&D, a portion of which comes in the form of salaries, has traditionally been considered an expense that does not explicitly add to GDP. But now, the United States will lead the rest of the world in redefining GDP. Washington has now declared that the $400 billion spent annually by U.S. businesses on R&D will count towards GDP. This equates to about 2.7% of our nearly $16 Trillion GDP. The argument goes that, for example, the GDP generated by iPhones has far exceeded the cost spent by Apple to develop the product. Therefore, Apple's R&D is not an expense but an investment.
The BEA also argues that the cost of producing television shows, movies, and music should count as investments that add to GDP. Supporters of the change often hold up the blockbuster television comedy Seinfeld as an example. Given that the show's billions in earnings far exceeded its initial costs, they argue that the production expenses should be considered "investments" (like R&D) and be added into GDP.
Economists who have staked their reputations on the efficacy of Keynesian growth strategies have argued that such changes will more accurately reflect the realities of our 21st century information economy. But their analysis ignores the failures so often associated with R&D and artistic productions. For every breakthrough iPhone there are dozens of ill-conceived gizmos that never get off the drawing board. For every Seinfeld, there are countless failures and bombs that leave nothing but losses.
In essence, the new methodology is an exercise in double accounting. For instance, suppose a company employs an accountant who works in the sales department, who is then transferred to the R&D department at the same salary. He still counts beans but now his salary will be billed to the R&D budget rather than sales. In the old methodology, the accountant's impact on GDP would come only from the personal consumption that his salary allows. Going forward, he will add to GDP in two ways: from his personal consumption and his salary's addition to his company's R&D budget. The same formula would apply to a trucker who switches from a freight company to a movie production company (for the same salary). If he moves refrigerators, he only adds to GDP through his personal spending, but if he hauls movie lights, his contribution to GDP is doubled. It makes no difference if the movie bombs.
These double shots are different from traditional investments, which inject savings (or idle cash) back into the marketplace. Until money from personal or corporate savings is invested, it is not adding to GDP.
Another change that will artificially boost GDP concerns how government salaries will be counted. Unlike most private sector compensation, wages, salaries, and pension contributions paid to government workers are added directly to GDP. This distinction makes sense and eliminates potentially double accounting. Profits generated by private companies add to GDP when they are ultimately spent or invested by the company. Wages reduce profits, and therefore reduce GDP. But that reduction is cancelled out by the consumption of the employee receiving the wages. Governments do not generate profits, so salaries are the only way that public spending adds back to GDP.
The new system magnifies the GDP impact of government pensions, which are a principal component of public sector compensation. Going forward, the pensions will be calculated not from actual contributions, but from what governments have promised. Under the old system, if a state had a $10,000 pension obligation but only contributed $1,000, only the $1,000 would be added to GDP. Under the new system the entire $10,000 would be counted. So now governments can magically grow the economy simply by making promises they can't keep.
The bottom line is that now certain private sector salaries (in R&D and entertainment) will be counted twice and public pension contributions will be counted even if they aren't made. The economy will not actually be any larger or grow any faster, but the statistics will claim otherwise. With the stroke of a pen, our debt to GDP ratio will come down. Will this soothe the fears of our creditors? Will critics of big government take comfort that spending as a share of GDP may be lower? My guess is that the government is confident that its trick will work, and that distracting attention with a statistical illusion is the sole motivation for the change.
A similar type of hocus pocus has been successfully used to make inflation appear much smaller. A few months ago I produced a video showing how changes in methods used to calculate the Consumer Price Index (CPI) have resulted in a widening gap between increases in real prices and the CPI. The changes, that incorporate such concepts as hedonic adjustments and substation bias, were made to make the CPI more "accurate," but have instead produced consistently lower results. Although I used a basket of 20 goods for that experiment, I gave particular attention to such things as newspaper and magazine prices and health insurance costs. But just recently I came across another data set that leads to the same conclusion.
Since the late 1980's, The Economist Magazine has compiled something called the "Big Mac Index,"(BMI) a global survey of the cost of McDonald's signature hamburger. Although the index is primarily used as a means to compare purchasing power parity around the globe, it also can be used to track the prices of Big Macs in the U.S. over many years.From 1986 to 2003 the U.S. BMI rose roughly in line with the CPI. Although the burger occasionally rose faster or slower, over that 17 year period both indexes increased by about 68% (or about 4% per year). But from April 2003 to January 2013 the CPI Index is up just 25% percent (from 183.8 to 230.28 or about 2.5% per year) while the BMI is up 61% (from $2.71 to $4.37 or about 6.1% per year), or more than twice the rate of inflation.
What could possibly account for the difference? Has the Big Mac gotten bigger, better, tastier, or healthier? As an iconic product, McDonald's has been reluctant to change a proven formula. If the Big Mac hasn't changed, is it possible that our inflation yardstick has?
It has been estimated that if the government used the same methodology to measure inflation that it used during the 1980's, we would be currently dealing with official inflation that would be many times higher than today's official 1.5% rate. The Big Mac appears to confirm this.
But now the government appears ready to distort the figures even further. With little resistance from the media or the public, the Obama Administration and Congressional Republicans seem ready to switch the inflation measurements used for Social Security away from the CPI in favor of the even more attenuated "Chain Weighted CPI." This index, which is consistently lower than the CPI, looks to incorporate changes in spending patterns when consumers switch to more affordable products (in other words, it measures the cost of survival, not the cost of living). And while many admit that this is a manipulation, no one really seems to care.
Similarly clumsy tricks have been used to make our unemployment problem appear less severe. Over the years new methods have been introduced to factor out those who have "dropped out" of the labor force or to count part-time or temporary workers as employed.
All this takes us right back to Don Draper. If you can't change the conversation, change the words. If that doesn't work, just change the dictionaries.
Peter Schiff is the CEO and Chief Global Strategist of Euro Pacific Capital, best-selling author and host of syndicated Peter Schiff Show.
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In the years following the global financial crisis, economists and investors have gotten very comfortable with very high, and seemingly persistent, government debt. The nonchalance may be underpinned by the assumption that globally significant countries that can print their own currencies can't get trapped in a sovereign debt crisis. However, it now appears that Japan is preparing to put this confidence to the ultimate stress test.
For the better part of 20 years, successive Japanese governments and central bankers have been trying, unsuccessfully, to use quantitative easing strategies to pump up a deflated asset bubble. The economy has by and large not responded. The sustained and impressive growth that Japan delivered during the 45 years following the Second World War (which had made the country one of the most successful economic stories in world history), has never returned. For the last 20 years Japan has offered a "zombie" economy characterized by low growth, stagnation, and exploding government debt. The Japanese government now owes approximately $12 trillion, a figure representing more than 200% of GDP. The IMF expects that this figure will reach 245% by the end of this year. This gives Japan the unenviable title of having the world's highest government debt-to-GDP ratio. But Shinzo Abe, the newly elected Prime Minister of Japan, and Haruhiko Kuroda, his newly-appointed Governor of the Bank of Japan, feel much, much more debt needs to be issued to turn the economy around.
The hope that Abe would be a new kind of prime minister with a bold economic formula helped revive the long dead Japanese stock market. Between May and November of 2012, the Nikkei traded within a range of 8200-9400. As Abe's victory began to be expected, the Nikkei started moving up, reaching 10,000 by the time he was sworn in on December 26 of last year. The euphoria continued throughout the spring and by April 2 the Nikkei stood at 12,003 points. Then on April 4, BOJ Governor Kuroda made good on Abe's dovish rhetoric and announced a plan to end years of mildly declining prices by doing whatever necessary to create 2% inflation (in reality these price declines have been one of the few consolations to Japanese consumers). To achieve its goals, the government is prepared to double the amount of Yen in circulation. Stocks immediately rallied, and in less than a week the Nikkei had breached 13,000 points, taking the index to a 4 1/2-year high. It is rare that any major stock market can achieve a 50% rally in less than a year. But the rally will be costly.
The Japanese government already spends 25% of tax revenue to service outstanding debt (compared to 6% in the US). These costs become even more astonishing when one considers the extremely low rates Japan pays. Ten-year Japanese government bonds now pay less than 0.6%, and five-year yields are now a little more than 0.20%. How much will debt service costs increase if Abe succeeds in pushing inflation to 2.0%? Two percent rates would triple long term borrowing costs. Given the size of its debts, increases of such magnitude could hit Japan with the force of 10 Godzillas.
Japan has an aging demographic and as more time goes by, the pool of potential bond buyers continues to shrink. Unlike the United States, where individual savers are mostly irrelevant in the sovereign debt market, Japanese investors have largely set the market in their own country. There is evidence to suggest that Japanese savers are increasingly considering overseas sources of yield for protection from the inflation that Abe is so determined to create.
As the Nikkei has moved upward, the Japanese Yen has taken the opposite trajectory, falling more than 20% against the U.S. Dollar since the beginning of 2012, and nearly 12% since the beginning of this year (the decline has been even greater in terms of several other currencies). This steep drop, which has taken a huge bite out of the nominal gains in Japanese stocks is unusual in the foreign exchange markets, and has threatened to destabilize an already weak global financial system.
Earlier this year the falling yen issue sparked a full-fledged headline war. On February 16th, participating members of the G20 issued a statement, clearly aimed at Japan, warning against competitive devaluations and currency wars. A day later, Japan's Finance Minister stated flatly that Japan was not attempting to manipulate its currency. After some hesitation, the G20 seemed to accept this statement. For now it seems the international powers have fallen in behind Japan. Both IMF Chief Christine Lagarde and Ben Bernanke have praised Abe's policies. The prevailing opinion seems to be that weakening a currency should not be considered manipulation as long as it's done to revive a domestic economy, not specifically to harm competitors. Such an opinion qualifies as a great moment in rhetorical shamelessness.
In addition to his plans for inflationary monetary policy, Abe is also attempting to wage war from the fiscal side as well. His Liberal Democratic Party has called for over $2.4 trillion USD worth of public works stimulus over the next 10 years. This spending represents approximately 40% of Japan's current GDP and, adjusted for population, would be the equivalent of nearly $600 billion USD annually in the United States.
It should be obvious to anyone with even half a brain that Japan's prior experiments with ever larger doses of quantitative easing have failed. Leaders in both Japan and the United States, however, are following this path with reckless abandon. According to Abe, the entirety of Japan's economic problems can be blamed on the fact that consumer prices have been declining by one tenth of one percent per year. If only Japanese consumers were forced to pay two percent more per year for the things they need or desire, all would be well.
Abe's wish may already be coming true. McDonald's announced this morning that, for the first time in 5 years, the price of hamburgers and cheeseburgers in Japan will be rising by 20% and 25% respectively. No doubt the Japanese will be so excited by this development that they'll rush to the stores to consume all the burgers they were planning on eating in 2014 before prices go up again. Of course there is no official concern that low-income Japanese will now have to pay more for low cost food.
The idea that informs Abe's plan, that rising prices entice consumers to buy before the prices go up, is clearly suspect as economic law dictates that demand increases when prices fall. Any store owner will tell you that cutting prices is the best way to move merchandise. Apart from this problem, how does Abe expect consumers to buy more when their currency is losing purchasing power and more of their incomes will be needed to pay interest on the national debt?
The boldness of Abe's plans should provide the rest of the world with a crash course in the ability of debt accumulation to jumpstart an economy. The good news is that the effects should not take too long to be seen. I believe that we will be treated with a stark lesson on the limitations of inflation as an economic panacea.
Hopefully, failure of this latest Japanese experiment will help convince leaders in the U.S. and Japan that the only true path to prosperity is free market capitalism. Rather than trying to reflate busted bubbles and micro-manage Keynesian style recoveries, politicians and central bankers should recognize their respective roles in creating the problems and get out of the way.
Peter Schiff is the CEO and Chief Global Strategist of Euro Pacific Capital, best-selling author and host of syndicated Peter Schiff Show.
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In the opening years of the last decade, most mainstream investors sat on the sidelines while "tin hat" goldbugs rode the bull market from below $300 to just over $1,000 per ounce. But following the 2008 financial crisis, when gold held up better than stocks during the decline and made new record highs long before the Dow Jones fully recovered, Wall Street finally sat up and took notice. The new devotees helped to push gold to nearly $1,900 by September of 2011. For the next year and a half it held relatively steady, trading mostly between $1,500 and $1,800 as more mainstream investors caught the fever. But now it appears that the brief love affair is at an end. It was really only a flirtation as the two were never a good match in the first place. Gold's new suitors never understood the fundamental case for gold and now they are turning their affection back to their true love: U.S. equities.
This is creating a brutal season for gold investors. The metal is in the midst of its largest pull back in nearly five years, and as the selling has gathered momentum powerful Wall Street voices as diverse as Goldman Sachs and George Soros have declared the end of its nearly fifteen year run of dominance.
The story line put out by most of these analysts is that gold shined as a safe haven during the Great Recession, but its allure has evaporated with the recent "improvements" in the global economy, particularly in the United States. Ironically, this ignores the fact that gold actually performed better in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis than it did during or following the crisis. That may be because the inflationary monetary policy that fueled the housing bubble also powered gold. Deflation fears led to gold's 35% decline in 2008, but once the Fed reopened the monetary spigots gold rallied to new highs. But in 2008 gold fell in concert with nearly every other asset class. This time, it's falling while other assets are rising. The negative spotlight makes the current decline potentially more meaningful.
Neither the new round of Keynesian expansion in Japan nor the recent fallout from the Cypriot solvency crisis produced gold rallies. Bears cite these failures as the signs that the bull is dead. The latest warning bell came late last week when the Bank of Cyprus announced that it would be selling its gold reserves in order to raise the cash to pay its debts. Concerns quickly spread that other heavily indebted Mediterranean countries with large gold reserves like Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain would follow suit. The tidal wave of selling would be expected to be the coup de grace for gold's glory years. While this neat narrative may be sufficient to convince the financial media that an historic shift is underway, wiser minds will see more nuance.
While the vast majority of economists see gold as the "barbarous relic" described by Keynes, the sentiment has not stopped many central bankers from holding huge quantities as currency reserves. It is a curious phenomenon that the countries with the most daunting debt problems have the highest percentage of gold in their foreign exchange reserves. Many of these countries were formerly prosperous, and at various points in their histories had gold-backed currencies that required large reserves. These legacy assets now account for the bulk of their reserve wealth.
The United Stated leads the pack with both the largest amount of gold in reserve (8,133 tons) and one of the highest percentages (76%). Other heavily indebted developed countries are not far behind: Italy has 2,450 tons and 72% of reserves, France has 2,435 tons and 71% reserves, Portugal has 382 tons and 90% reserves, and Greece has 112 tons and 82% reserves. Tiny Cyprus, whose travails are creating global ripples, has just 14 tons (58% of reserves).
In contrast, the quickly developing emerging market economies are conspicuous for very small gold reserves, particularly in comparison to their much larger reserves of foreign currencies. Many of these countries have generated large amounts of U.S. dollar reserves as a result of ongoing trade surpluses. While China has more than 1,000 tons of gold, the cache only represents 2% of their enormous foreign exchange coffers. Even gold loving India has just 10%. Neither Russia, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, nor Brazil has more than 10% (with most having far less than 5%). Bankers and political leaders in all of these countries, particularly India and China, have lamented publicly about the very high percentage of U.S. dollars in their reserves, and have even spoken fondly about the reliability and importance of gold.
The heavy debtors in the Eurozone have few pleasant options to deal with their insolvency. As illustrated by Cyprus, the choices may come down to painful austerity or raiding supposedly sacred bank deposits. The sale of gold reserves may provide a much more palatable option for politicians. After all, do voters really care how much gold sits in national vaults? For now at least, international central bank gold agreements limit the amount of gold that they can sell in a given year. But as these sovereign debt crises deepen for countries like Italy and Portugal, many justly question how long these paper agreements will keep the selling pressure at bay.
While I believe that they may indeed succumb to the temptation, such moves may not be disruptive, or even negative for gold. Large divestitures by some countries may lead to corresponding accumulations cash rich, but gold poor, creditor nations like India, China, Russia, and Indonesia. Such transactions would likely take place through private, direct, and tightly communicated sales. As a result, they would be far less disruptive than would be the case were they to occur in relatively thinly traded public markets as many now fear.
Such a transfer in gold holdings would be the logical result of the drift of the global economy over the past half century. Despite its current disfavor, gold is real wealth. Governments and bankers know this. As the emerging economies gain wealth, and the developed countries dissipate wealth through welfare-state debt accumulation, it is inevitable that the gold follows. It's not a question of if, but when.
While nations buying gold will pay for their purchases with dollars, the sellers will not re-invest the proceeds into Treasuries. Dollars raised through gold sales will be converted to local currency and used to repay debt. This will put downward pressure on both the U.S. dollar and Treasuries. In addition, emerging market central bankers will be more likely to hold onto gold for the long-term, thereby providing a bullish impact on the market. In essence, such a shift would flush out the weak hands who don't have the resources to protect their wealth in favor of stronger hands that do.
Creditor nations that buy gold cheap from bankrupt nations forced to sell at distressed prices will see the value of their reserves swell, thereby gaining the independence and confidence they need to finally break their reliance on the U.S. dollar as their principal reserve asset. When the reign of "king dollar" finally comes to a belated end, let's hope all the gold we allegedly have stored in Fort Knox is actually there. We're going to need every ounce of it.
Peter Schiff is the CEO and Chief Global Strategist of Euro Pacific Capital, best-selling author and host of syndicated Peter Schiff Show.
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This week, while economists should have been closely considering the implications of the actual bankruptcy of Stockton, California, they instead heaped scorn on the perceived ideological bankruptcy of David Stockman. In other words, Stockman trumped Stockton.
Ronald Reagan's former Budget Director contributed "Sundown in America" a multi-page opinion piece to the Sunday New York Times which loudly and eloquently described the illusions of our current economic system. While I don't agree with everything Stockman believes, I think he is showing great wisdom and courage in making dire predictions and calling for extreme changes in our policy and politics.
What was perhaps more surprising than the Times' uncharacteristic decision to run the piece in the first place was the vitriolic and largely ad hominem backlash against Stockman that quickly emerged from across the political spectrum. The attacks have focused primarily on his history and personality, and not on his arguments. One would be hard pressed to find any journalistic reaction that did not use the words "screed" "rant" or "unhinged." I believe these responses reveal an acute sensitivity from mainstream economists that arises from defending contorted Keynesian logic.
It can't be easy to take the position that debt doesn't matter and that spending creates economic growth. To do so with any hope of success requires team unity, and Stockman has never really been a team player. His reputation as an apostate and a naysayer has made him an easy target.
Famously, Stockman left the Reagan White House in protest over the Gipper's half-finished mandate. Yes, Reagan had cut taxes, but he never really cut spending. Stockman never bought into the easy idea, championed by Jack Kemp and Dick Cheney, that deficits don't matter and that tax cuts pay for themselves. And although the Reagan revolution did clear the way for a return to better growth in the 80's and 90's, Stockman knew that the piper would call someday to collect the debt. Despite his foresight on that topic, his criticism of the Reagan legacy has earned him the derision of the Republican establishment for whom that particular hero worship is sacred.
This may have informed the attack issued by neo-conservative apologist and Iraq war cheerleader, David Frum, who offered a solely psychological assessment: "Stockman provides an insight into the gloomy mindset that overtakes us in older age, it's a valuable warning to those of still middle-aged that once we lose our faith in the future, it's time to stop talking about politics in public." So much for respecting our elders.
Bloomberg's Jeff Kearns, whose support of Fed policy has earned him regular taps at Ben Bernanke's televised press conferences, provided the most common mainstream dismissal of Stockman: "His warning that the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing is steering the world's largest economy toward a crash is at odds with nine quarters of job growth, record stock prices and unprecedented corporate earnings." This "he must be wrong because things look good now" position supposes that economics can't be understood or predicted, only observed. I received very similar treatment back in 2006 and 2007 when I tried to tell the mainstream that the real estate market was a house of cards. How could it be bad, they said, if it goes up every year?
Despite his misalignment with the Republican hierarchy, the Left has an even greater revulsion for Stockman. Since the crisis, he has become perhaps the most respected figure (with the possible exception of Alan Meltzer) to take the position that a system based on fiat currency is doomed. Those who most visibly argue these points, like Ron and Rand Paul, and myself, come from the libertarian movement. As a result, we can be easily dismissed as cranks. However, Stockman was once a card-carrying member of the power elite. His embrace of these principles is taken more seriously and is thus ripe for instant attack from liberal economists.
While the usual suspects of Jared Bernstein and Joe Wiesenthal weighed in with heaps of invective, the loudest heckles have come from, whom else, Paul Krugman. He began his multi-post campaign by questioning the "mystery" of why the New York Times would sully Krugman's own gravitas by forcing him to share column inches with someone as "non serious" as Stockman. He then offers the back of his hand:
"I thought Stockman would offer some kind of real argument, some presentation, however tendentious, of evidence. Instead it's just a series of gee-whiz, context- and model-free numbers embedded in a rant - and not even an interesting rant. It's cranky old man stuff." For the record, Stockman is only 66.
In actuality, Stockman's NYT piece offers a litany of objectively dismal facts and cogent explanations of how we got here. While most are celebrating the nominal high of U.S. stocks (see my recent analysis of the current rally), he points out that in the five and half years it has taken for the S&P 500 to set a new high, "Real median family income growth has dropped 8 percent, and the number of full-time middle class jobs, 6 percent. The real net worth of the 'bottom' 90 percent has dropped by one-fourth. The number of food stamp and disability aid recipients has more than doubled to 59 million, about one in five Americans." But Krugman fails to find the currency of his stock and trade, the macro-economic statistical models that attempt to describe how an economy works. In truth, those academic ordeals only matter in getting tenure and impressing the global elite. The real economy is much easier to understand.
Case in point: Stockton, California, which on Monday became the largest U.S. city to file for bankruptcy protection. Stockton, a city of 300,000 and two hours from San Francisco, is following the path blazed by many smaller California municipalities that have been unable to support lavish spending, salary and pension guarantees. And although Stockton has tightened its belt over the last few years (unlike similarly bankrupt San Bernadino, which is not even trying), it lacks the capacity to close the gap. Despite its enormous advantages in geography, infrastructure and location, the city is too bloated with government and clogged with taxes and regulation to allow for robust growth. As a result, Stockton is looking to pin the losses on its creditors.
As Stockman makes clear, the United States has been plagued by the same problems that doomed Stockton. His critics argue that the Federal Reserve's printing press provides a foolproof immunity to such pedestrian problems. But in the end, these paper protections will only exist on paper. We're all Stocktonians now.
Peter Schiff is the CEO and Chief Global Strategist of Euro Pacific Capital, best-selling author and host of syndicated Peter Schiff Show.
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After selling off an astounding 56% between October of 2007 and March 2009, the S&P 500 has staged a rally for the ages, surging 120% and recovering all of its lost ground too. This stunning turnaround certainly qualifies as one of the more memorable, and unusual, stock market rallies in history. The problem is that the rally has been underwritten by the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policies But for some reason, this belief has not weakened the celebration.
Although the Fed has been tinkering with interest rates and liquidity for a century, nothing in its history could prepare the markets for its activities over the last four years. (See 'The Stimulus Trap' article in my latest newsletter). And while most market analysts give credit to Ben Bernanke for saving the economy and sparking the rally, they have not fully grasped that market performance is now almost completely correlated to Fed activism. A detailed look at stock market movements over the past four years reveals a clear pattern: upward movements are directly tied to the delivery of fresh stimulants from the Fed. Downward movements occur when markets perceive that the deliveries will stop. In other words, the rally is really just a bender. The rest is commentary.
Since 2008, the Fed has injected fresh cash into the economy with four distinct shots of quantitative easing and has added two kickers of Operation Twist. In recent months, the Fed has dispensed with the pretense of designing, announcing, and serving new rounds of stimulus and is now continuously monetizing over $85 billion per month of Treasury and mortgage-backed debt. The new cash needs a place to go, and stocks, which now often provide higher yields than long term Treasury bonds, and which offer much better protections against inflation, provide the best outlet.
But the four year rally has been punctuated by several sharp and brief drops. It is no coincidence that these episodes occurred during periods in which the delivery of fresh stimulus was in doubt. If the Fed were ever to follow through on its promise to exit the bond market, we believe the current rally would come to an immediate halt. This provides yet another reason to believe that stimulus is now permanent.
A close look at the performance of the S&P 500 over the past four years tells the story.
Source: Yahoo! Finance, Euro Pacific Capital. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. (Click here to enlarge)
In May 2007, with the "Goldilocks" economy of 2005 and 2006 still in control, the S&P finally eclipsed the March 2000 high of the dotcom era. It ultimately hit an all-time high of 1565 in October 2007. But later in the year, things began to unravel when bankruptcies of premier subprime lenders signaled real trouble. A blood bath, though, did not materialize. As late as August 2008, the S&P was trading at nearly 1300, down a less-than-tragic 16% from its high. But when Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and AIG imploded almost simultaneously in September 2008, the markets panicked. Hundreds of billions of dollars of potentially worthless debt now sat on the books of the nation's financial system. No one knew where the next bomb would explode. A stampede thus ensued. (A minor replay of this dynamic just occurred in Cyprus. See my recent commentary for more on this).
Less than a month later the index fell below 900, a fall of more than 30%. By November 21, the S&P had lost another 100 points. Four days later, the Fed introduced the first round of what would come to be commonly known as "quantitative easing". This consisted of purchasing $600 billion of government-sponsored enterprises debt and mortgage-backed securities. By the day of the announcement (even though nothing had yet been done), the S&P rallied almost 50 points to 851. Still encouraged by the Fed, the S&P was at 931 on January 6, 2009, significantly higher than in late November.
Despite the first round of asset purchases, the market was still in chaos and had not yet stabilized. By early March, the S&P had lost an additional 25%, bringing total "peak-to-trough" losses at more than 50%. On March 18, 2009, the Fed announced that it was going to expand the size of its stimulus program. This time it really got the stock market's attention. The new guidelines called for a total purchase of $1.25 trillion of MBS and $300 billion of Treasury debt. On the day of the announcement, the S&P opened at 776 and by the time the asset purchases were complete a year later, in March 2010, the S&P was trading at 1171, an increase of 50%.
When the spigots of quantitative easing shut down in the second quarter of 2010 the S&P turned south, declining to a low of 1022 in July (a 13% decline from March). In late August, just before Bernanke delivered his 2010 Jackson Hole speech, in which he would hint at the next round of stimulus (to be later dubbed "QE2"), the S&P was still hovering a full 10% below its post QE1 high. But the expectation of another shot was enough to ignite a rally. When the formal announcement of QE2 came in November, the index had already advanced to 1193. When the program expired at the end of the 2nd quarter of 2011, the S&P stood at 1307, a 25% increase from before Bernanke jawboned the markets at Jackson Hole.
The market response to QE2 was in many ways similar, if less spectacular, than its prior response to QE1. And like the first go-round, the rally ended with the withdrawal of stimulus. In addition, after the cessation of QE2, the markets had to contend with the farce of the U.S. debt ceiling drama. As a result, the S&P declined from a high of 1343 on July 22 to 1123 by August 19, a drop of 16%. This is also the same time period when the U.S. received its downgrade by Standard and Poor's. Ironically, the U.S. eventually got a temporary reprieve from the spotlight when its problems became overshadowed by funding tensions in Greece and Southern Europe, causing the market to once again flock to the so-called "safe haven" of U.S. assets.
The cover from Europe could only go so far. Pressure soon began to build on the Fed to deliver once again. It acted in September 2011 with its "Operation Twist", a program that consisted of buying longer-term treasuries while selling an equal amount of shorter dated paper. Although Twist was advertised as being balance sheet neutral, the short-term sales the Fed made were somewhat offset by the extension of credit lines to Europe and an extended commitment to the 0% interest rate policy that at the time called for an end date of mid-2013. The day the Fed announced Operation Twist, the S&P opened at 1203. By the following April it had reached 1400, a return of 16%.
But once again the stimulus began to fade. In the second quarter of 2012, a sell off took hold, and by June 5, the S&P traded as low as 1277, a decline of 9% since April. Cue the Fed! On June 20, the Fed announced the extension of Operation Twist, sparking a new rally which has continued into 2013. This buoyancy has been maintained, in part, by the announcement of QE3 on September 13, 2012, which also included another extension of the zero interest rate policy until at least mid-2015. By October, Fed governors were already mentioning inflation targets and when QE4 was launched on December 12, they clarified that zero interest rate policies would be in place until unemployment fell below 6.5%. The current leg of the rally has been somewhat non-linear as the election, the Fiscal Cliff, and the endless empty headlines out of Europe have continued to put pressure on the markets. Despite these obstacles, the S&P has rallied past 1500 and on March 5, 2013, it closed at 1538, within shouting distance of its all-time high of 1576 on October 11, 2007.
When the Fed made the first round of asset purchases in November of 2008, the market was still in a state of flux. However, since the system stabilized in mid 2009, there has been a reliable correlation between the timing of the programs and the performance of the markets. This intention was stated explicitly in Ben Bernanke's November 4,2010, Washington Times Op-ed in which he provided the rationale for QE2:
"This approach eased financial conditions in the past and, so far, looks to be effective again. Stock prices rose and long-term interest rates fell when investors began to anticipate the most recent action. Easier financial conditions will promote economic growth. For example, lower mortgage rates will make housing more affordable and allow more homeowners to refinance. Lower corporate bond rates will encourage investment. And higher stock prices will boost consumer wealth and help increase confidence, which can also spur spending."
With the Fed on pace to expand its balance sheet by over $1 trillion in 2013, there can be little doubt that much of that money is headed straight into the stock market. Treasury bonds are still offering negative real yields and so there is less incentive than ever to own government paper.
Recently, the New York Post's Jonathan Trugman pointed out that Citigroup could be considered the poster child of the dubious rally. Since the crisis began, he reports that the Bank has received $45 billion in TARP funding, an additional $45 billion line of credit from the Treasury, and a government guarantee of $300 billion for its own troubled assets. At the same time, its cost of capital (the money it borrows from the Fed) is near zero, while it earns 3% to 5% on mortgages and 12% to 18% on credit cards. But from an operational standpoint, those gifts have failed to create a flourishing, self-sustaining, business. The company had shed almost 100,000 employees from its period of peak employment a few years ago (down to 260,000 employees) and it announced three months ago that an additional 11,000 cuts are to come. But Citi's share price has risen more than 85 percent since June of 2012, despite scant evidence that the company has turned itself around.
But look what all the Fed intervention has wrought. Each time they have intervened the resulting rally has diminished in intensity, and a sell-off has always ensued when the drug wore off. Through the years, the cycle of stimulus administration has quickened pace and has now arrived at a stage where it is continuous. Currently, the Fed is talking about a potential exit strategy, but as we have argued in the past, and as the chart above surely indicates, any withdrawal of stimulus could likely have dire implications for stocks which will not be tolerated by Washington.
Japan has been unsuccessfully trying to inflate its way out of these problems for the past 20 years(see 'Japan's Dangerous Game' in my latest newsletter). Now many of the indebted nations of the developed world seem intent to follow that example. But the monetary experiment of unending stimulus has, up to now, never been tried on a global scale. No one knows when or how it will end, but I believe it will end badly.
Investing in stocks is supposed to be a way to harness real economic growth, not a way to front run stimulus. Our advice for stock investors is to recognize that and to get as far away from artificially induced highs as possible. More fundamentally sound markets exist. We just have to find them.
Peter Schiff is the CEO and Chief Global Strategist of Euro Pacific Capital, best-selling author and host of syndicated Peter Schiff Show.
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For years we have been warned by Keynesian economists to fear the so-called "liquidity trap," an economic cul-de-sac that can suck down an economy like a tar pit swallowing a mastodon. They argue that economies grow because banks lend and consumers spend. But a "liquidity trap," they argue, convinces consumers not to consume and businesses not to borrow. The resulting combination of slack demand and falling prices creates a pernicious cycle that cannot be overcome by the ordinary forces that create growth, like savings or investment. They say that a liquidity trap can even resist the extraordinary force of monetary stimulus by rendering cash injections into useless "string pushing." Some of these economists suggest that its power can only be countered by a world war or other fortunately timed event that leads to otherwise politically unattainable levels of government spending.
Putting aside the dubious proposition that the human desire to strive and succeed can be permanently short-circuited by an economic contraction, and that modest expected price declines can quell our desire to consume, the Keynesians have overlooked a much more dangerous and demonstrable pitfall of their own creation: something that I call "The Stimulus Trap." This condition occurs when an economy becomes addicted to the monetary stimulus provided by a central bank, and as a result fails to restructure itself in a manner that will allow for robust, and sustainable, growth. The trap redirects capital into non-productive sectors and starves those areas of the economy that could lead an economic rebirth. The condition is characterized by anemic growth and deteriorating underlying economic fundamentals which is often masked by inflation or asset price bubbles (I look at how stimulus has impacted the U.S. stock market in the March edition of my newsletter).
Japan has been caught in such a stimulus trap for more than a decade. Following a stock and housing market boom of unsustainable proportions in the 1980s, the Japanese economy spectacularly imploded in 1991. The crash initiated a "lost decade" of de-leveraging and contraction. But beginning in 2001, the Bank of Japan unveiled a series of unconventional policies that it describes as "quantitative easing," which involved pushing interest rates to zero, flooding commercial banks with excess liquidity, and buying unprecedented quantities of government bonds, asset-backed securities, and corporate debt. Although Japan has been technically in recovery ever since, its performance is but a shadow of the roaring growth that typified the 40 years prior to 1991. Recently, conditions in Japan have deteriorated further and the underlying imbalances have gotten progressively worse. Yet despite this, the new government is set to double down on the failed policies of the last decade.
I believe that the United States is now following Japan into the mire. After the crash of 2008, we implemented nearly the same set of policies as did Japan in 2001. In the past two years, despite the surging stock market and apparently declining unemployment rate, the size and scope of these efforts have increased. But as is the case in Japan, we can clearly witness how the stimulus has perpetuated stagnation. (See my analysis of the new plans of the Japanese government).
In 2008, one of the country's biggest problems was that we had over-leveraged too many non-productive sectors of the economy. For instance, we irresponsibly lent far too much money to people to buy over-priced real estate. Since then, the problem has gotten worse. Currently the process of writing, securitizing, and buying home mortgages has been essentially nationalized. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (which are now officially government agencies) write and package the vast majority of new home mortgages, which are then guaranteed (almost exclusively) through the Federal Housing Administration, and then sold to the Federal Reserve. According to a tally by ProPublica, these government entities bought or insured more than nine out of 10 home mortgages originated last year, a $1.3 trillion business. Compare this to 2006, when the government share was only three in 10. As a result of this, our lending is far more irresponsible than it has ever been.
In the fourth quarter of 2012, 44% of all FHA borrowers either had no credit score or a score of 679 or lower. In addition, the overwhelming majority of FHA guaranteed loans are being made at 95% or greater loan-to-value. This means down payments are an afterthought. Under the FHA's Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), loans are now even extended to underwater borrowers whose mortgages may be worth far more than their homes. As a result, the FHA could be exposed to enormous losses in the event of future housing market downturns. Such an outcome would be likely if mortgage interest rates were ever to rise even modestly from their current low levels.
In fact, losses on low-quality mortgages have already left the FHA with $16 billion in losses. To close the gap, it has had to raise the insurance premiums it charges to borrowers. With those premiums expected to rise again next month, many fear that marginal borrowers could be priced out of the market. But rather than learning from its mistakes, the government just announced that Fannie Mae would pick up the slack, lowering its lending standards to match the ones that had led to losses at the FHA. In other words, we haven't solved the problem of bad lending - we have simply made it bigger and nationalized it.
The overall financial sector is equally addicted to cheap money. Banks have seen strong earnings and rising share prices in recent years. But their businesses have largely focused on the simple process of capturing the spread between the zero percent cost of Fed capital and the 3% yield of long term Treasury debt and government insured mortgage backed securities. As a result, banks are not making productive private sector loans to businesses. Instead, the capital is being used to pump up the already bloated housing and government sectors.
Corporate profits are indeed high at the moment, but much of that success comes from the extremely low borrowing costs and extremely high leverage. Investors chasing any kind of yield they can find are pouring money into companies with dubious prospects. This January, yields on junk rated debt fell below 6% for the first time. Currently they are approaching 5.5%. Consumers are using cheap money to buy on credit. Savings rates are now hitting post-recession lows.
Lastly (but certainly not least), the Federal government is now totally dependent on the Fed's largess. Without the Fed buying the bulk of Treasury debt, interest rates would likely rise, thereby increasing the cost of servicing the massive national debt. While Congress and the media have focused on the $85 billion in annual cuts earmarked in the "Sequester," an increase of Treasury yields to 5% (3% higher than current levels) on the $16 trillion in outstanding government debt would translate to $480 billion per year of increased interest payments. Such an increase would force a tough choice between raising taxes, cutting domestic spending or reducing interest payments sent abroad for debt service. If foreign creditors begin to doubt that America has the resolve to make the hard choices, they may refuse to roll-over maturing obligations, forcing the government to actually repay principal. With trillions maturing each year, actual repayment is mathematically impossible.
But for now most people feel that the transition is underway to a healthy economy. The prevailing debate is when and how the Fed will let the economy fly on its own. Many of the top market analysts have great faith that Ben Bernanke can pull the monetary tablecloth off the table without disturbing the dishes. Those who hold this view fail to understand that the United States is caught in a stimulus trap from which there is no easy exit. How can the Fed wean the economy from stimulus when stimulus IS the economy? In truth, the trick Bernanke must actually perform is to pull the table out from beneath the cloth, leaving both the cloth and the dishes suspended in air. (Read how Iceland confronted its own crisis while avoiding the stimulus trap).
What would happen to the Treasury market if the Federal Reserve, by far the biggest buyer and largest holder of Treasury bonds, became a net seller? Who will be there to keep the sell off from becoming an interest rate spiking rout? It may sound absurd to those of us who remember the economy before the crash, but our new economy can't tolerate "sky high" rates of four or five percent. What would happen to the housing market and the stock market if interest rates were to return to those traditional levels? The red ink would flow in rivers. With yields rising and asset prices falling, how long would it take before the Fed reverses course and serves up another round of stimulus? Not long at all.
That means any talk of an exit strategy is just that, talk. Not only can the Fed not exit, but it will have to delve further into the stimulus abyss. While doing so, the Fed will continuously insist that the exit lies just behind an ever moving horizon. It will repeat this mantra until a currency crisis finally forces a painful exit.
Unfortunately, the longer the Fed waits to exit, the more painful the exit will be. But trading long-term pain for short-term gain is the Fed's specialty. In the meantime, Wall Street watches in uncomprehending stupor as the economy settles deeper and deeper into the stimulus trap.
Peter Schiff is the CEO and Chief Global Strategist of Euro Pacific Capital, best-selling author and host of syndicated Peter Schiff Show.
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This week financial analysts, economists, politicians, and bank depositors from around the world were outraged that European leaders, more specifically the Germans, currently calling many of the shots in Brussels and Frankfurt, could be so politically reckless, economically ignorant, and emotionally callous as to violate the sanctity of bank deposits in order to fund a bailout of Cyprus. The chorus of condemnation may have been the deciding factor in giving the Cypriot parliament the confidence to unanimously vote down the measures in hopes that Berlin will cave or Russia will swoop in with a bailout.
The decision to inflict pain on both large and small depositors was almost universally described as a historic blunder. But the mistake was to do so in a manner that was not camouflaged by financial smoke and mirrors. In truth, rank and file depositors have been paying, and will continue to pay, for all manner of bailouts and stimulus. (Read about the Stimulus Trap in my just released newsletter).Whether it's through lower interest payments on deposits, inflation, higher taxes, higher borrowing costs, or the accumulation of unsustainable sovereign debt, Cypriots will bear the burden of past profligacy. But the new plan for Cyprus was far too transparent, simple, and direct to survive in a world dependent on deceit and obfuscation. It was dead on arrival.
All over the world, most notably in the United States, Britain and Japan, central bankers are actively pursuing inflation targets of two to three percent. But isn't inflation, which allows governments to pay off debt through the creation of new money that transfers purchasing power from savers to borrowers, just a deposit tax in disguise? (Read more about Japan's plan to do just that). British citizens of all means have been living with such a three percent stealth tax for the past three years, and it is expected to stay that high for at least two more years. Yet a one-time tax of 6.75% in Cyprus is seen as the ultimate act of betrayal?
Many are lamenting that Cyprus' membership in the EU prevents it from devaluing its own currency to get out of the jam. How would such a course be morally superior? Taking actual losses on deposits is no different than taking losses through devaluation and inflation. Both result in the loss of purchasing power. Asking for a depositor haircut at least deals with the problem honestly and immediately. Although it's not quite as honest, devaluation can also be effective.
The same dynamic holds true with bailout funds. Suppose the EU were to come through with more funds? All that means is that Cypriots will have to pay more in future debt and interest repayments. In so doing they would saddle future generations with a burden that they had no hand in creating. How is that fair?
And it's not as if depositors at Cypriot banks, many of whom are reported to be Russian citizens seeking tax havens, were not complicit in the risk taking. Bloomberg reports that over the past five years euro deposits at Cyprus banks returned more than 24 percent cumulatively, almost double the returns on comparable German accounts. The banks were able to offer such returns because they were exposed to riskier assets (i.e. Greek government bonds). What's so wrong with asking those who took greater risks to earn higher returns to give something back when their decisions go bad?
Cypriot citizens, as members of the EU, had the choice to put their deposits in any EU bank. Even after paying the taxes that had been proposed in the bailout, long-term depositors would have made more money by keeping their savings in the high yielding Cypriot banks than low yielding German banks. So what kind of sadistic Rubicon are we crossing?
The predominating fear internationally was not that mom and pop Cypriots would have trouble making ends meet, or that Russian mobsters would have lost any of their questionable fortunes, but that a run on banks in Cyprus would lead to similar panics in Greece, Spain, and then the world at large. As a result, the troubles of an insignificant economy are seen to threaten the entire global financial edifice. This is just the latest sign that our current system rests upon nothing but confidence...which in the end can be ephemeral.
Despite the surmounting mathematical challenges faced by the overly indebted countries, investors have confidence that central banks will be able to engineer a return to sustainable economic growth without creating runaway inflation or triggering a renewed recession through premature tightening. This would be a tall order in even the best of circumstances. But if a small issue like Cyprus can shake that confidence...how strong can it be? Read how this confidence in central bank support has been the driving force in stock market rally.
Interestingly, the troubles in Cyprus have encouraged many to boast about the comparative health of American banking institutions and the superior sanctity of our own depositor protections. Both of these strengths are illusory, and as a result, what happens in Cyprus will not necessarily stay in Cyprus.
This month the Federal Reserve released the results of "stress tests" that it conducted on the major U.S. banks. While the media heralded the overwhelming success, in which 14 of 16 institutions received gold stars, they did not mention how the tests failed to test how the banks would perform if interest rates were to return to their historic norms.
Currently, the ultra-low rates provided by the Federal Reserve, which provide a low cost of capital and sustain profits on highly leveraged bond and mortgage portfolios, are a key element keeping banks in the black. All of that would be threatened in a rising rate environment. And while the tests did assume that rates would rise from the current 1.9% on the 10 year Treasury, there were no considerations for yields surpassing 4%. They assume that interest rates will stay near historic lows, no matter how bad (or good) the economy gets, how high inflation rises, or how much money the government borrows.
The Fed saw yields rising to 4% (by the end of 2015) only under their most optimistic forecast. In the scenarios involving economic deterioration, they predicted yields would come down dramatically from current levels. At no point did researchers ask the most fundamental questions: What if all the money that has been created over the past few years leads to an increase in inflation that forces interest rates past 4% even if the economy remains weak -- do they not remember the stagflation of the 1970s? Or what if the continued fiscal cowardice in Washington leads to a diminishment of bond investors' enthusiasm?
Given our past experience with bursting bubbles, would it not have been wise for the Fed to consider whether banks could withstand the bursting of the Treasury bond bubble, which many suggest is the biggest bubble of them all? But since the Fed did not recognize the smaller bubbles until after they burst, it is not surprising that they are equally blind to this one? The Fed, after all, does not have a history of learning from its mistakes. However, I believe the oversight is no accident. The Fed knows that major banks would fail if the bond market crashed, but it does not want to shake the confidence that is essential to the current economy.
This episode also puts into starker focus the inadequacy of deposit insurance. By offering the illusion of systemic safety in bank deposits, government guarantees encourage recklessness by banks and depositors. They provide the same incentives that federal flood insurance does in convincing homeowners to build on flood zones. Consumer choice and risk aversion are powerful forces that could bring needed discipline to banking. The FDIC in the U.S. is in the same situation as insurance giant AIG before the crash of 2008.
While the FDIC currently has about $25 billion available to bail out failing banks in the event of isolated events (mainly held in U.S. treasuries that would need to be sold), it insures more than $10 trillion in deposits. Clearly it lacks the resources to cover major losses in a systemic failure. A failure of just one of the nation's forty largest banks could swamp the resources of the FDIC. I believe that a significant spike in Treasury yields, to say 6%, would result in the failure of several major banks. Bank of America and Citibank for example each have over $1 trillion in deposits. Where would the FDIC get the money to make the depositors whole in such a situation? The government would be unlikely to pass a major tax increase to fund an FDIC bailout. More likely the Fed would print the money. In that event, depositors may not lose their money, but their money will lose much of its purchasing power. In the end, honest losses could prove to be much smaller.
Peter Schiff is the CEO and Chief Global Strategist of Euro Pacific Capital, best-selling author and host of syndicated Peter Schiff Show.
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Testifying before the US Senate this past Tuesday, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke made an extraordinary claim about its bloated balance sheet: "We could exit without ever selling by letting it run off." What Bernanke means here is that the Fed could simply hold its Treasuries and agency bonds until they mature, at which point the government would then be forced to pay the Fed back the principal amount. Through this process, the Fed's unprecedented and inflationary position will be gradually and placidly unwound.
Growing rumors last month of a potential "tightening" of monetary policy - seemingly confirmed by the Fed minutes released on Feb. 20th - have spooked the precious metals markets, leading to a 5.8% correction in gold and 10.2% in silver.
However, these fears are preposterous on two counts.
First, the Fed just spent the past year and a half extending the maturities of its entire portfolio. That was the entire purpose of Operation Twist. The average maturity of the entire portfolio is now over 10 years. That means any wind-down using the strategy Bernanke outlined would play out over the course of decades - not months or years.
Fortunately for hard asset investors, it is unlikely to play out at all.
The second reason these fears are unfounded is that there is no exit strategy. Listening to Bernanke's testimony, it was clear that here was a man simply speculating about when an exit might be undertaken - or perhaps ifit would ever be taken. Senator Corker from Tennessee accused Bernanke during the hearing of being "the biggest dove since World War II." "I think it's something you're rather proud of," the Senator continued. The Chairman's response to the charge of recklessly endangering the nation's currency? "In some respects, I am."
The Fed Chairman has been talking about tightening for some time. In 2010, he said, "As the expansion matures, the Federal Reserve will need to begin to tighten monetary conditions to prevent the development of inflationary pressures."
Back then, the same mainstream analysts were predicting recovery and a reversal of quantitative easing (QE). Instead, we have subsequently seen QE2, Operation Twist, and now QE3 to eternity.
While these mainstream commentators are at best guessing as to why or when the Fed might reverse course, I understand that it is extremely unlikely to do so for the foreseeable future. In fact, I've bet my net worth on it.
There is no exit strategy because the results of the Fed withdrawing its artificial support would be disastrous for the US Treasury and in the short-term, the US economy.
The Fed is expected to buy nearly 90% of new Treasury bonds in 2013, according to Bloomberg. This is a tremendous subsidy that has kept 10-year Treasury yields below 1.95% on average this year so far. Last year, with 10-year yields averaging 1.8%, the Treasury spent $360 billion on interest payments alone. That represented nearly 10% of all expenditures.
Let's assume a Fed tightening causes these rates to triple - not unreasonable for a government facing over 100% debt-to-GDP. If these rates triple by 2015, and another $2 trillion or so is added to the debt, then interest would make up over 30% of annual federal expenditures. Just interest. Then, there are principal repayments, Medicare/Medicaid, Social Security, the Armed Forces, and all the other entitlements for which the Treasury is responsible. Is Washington going to default on our creditors, our seniors, or our men and women in uniform?
I believe these assumptions are still rosy compared to what might actually happen if the Fed were to withdraw support. As I outlined in my January Gold Letter, the US sovereign debt market is a house of cards in which the Fed, foreign creditors, and domestic investors each play a part. If the Fed were to signal that creditors might face haircuts, then the reaction could be swift to the downside. If rates went above 10%, as they have in Greece, then over half of the federal budget would be committed to interest payments alone.
But that's not all. Higher interest rates would cause the shaky housing market to take another nosedive. Few Americans are in a position to buy a $300K house at 10+% interest. Rather, prices would have to decline to levels affordable for cash buyers and those willing and able to take out high-interest mortgages. That might mean another 50% decline or more, in real terms.
With housing taking a second bath, we can expect the banks not to be far behind. That sector remains bloated and dependent on various subsidies from the Fed. With loan rates higher than their customers can afford, banks would fail at a rate higher than 2007-8. This would trigger another round of bailouts from the Treasury; but without Fed assistance, where will the funds come from?
If there isn't a bailout, the major money-center banks would collapse, crippling Wall Street's reputation as the global financial center. The US dollar's reserve status might then be abandoned once and for all.
Quickly, one can see how the Fed's money-printing is the mask holding this charade together.
To see in real time what happens when the mask is pulled off, look to the Mediterranean. Greece has seen the Golden Dawn neo-nazi party win 7% of seats in the last two elections. Italy, meanwhile, just saw a comedian with no political background grab 25% of its parliament in a satirical candidacy. Street protests, unemployment, and other signs of instability are rampant. The protestors are not learning a tough lesson about the consequences of profligate spending; instead, they're simply angry that the money has stopped flowing.
No one in Washington - not least Ben Bernanke - has any intention of setting off a similar episode in the US. Yet, that's exactly what a tightening of monetary policy would do. So, at least as long as the CPI numbers can be fudged to make inflation appear "contained," the Fed is going to keep filling the punch bowl.
Returning to the latest Fed minutes that have hard asset investors so upset, it is telling that while there was some discussion of the dangers of money-printing, only one of twelve governors actually voted against continuing current policies. With no concrete actions being taken and an overwhelming majority still in favor of current policies, it seems gold bears are making much ado about nothing.
As investors realize this, they will once again put their pedals to the precious metals.
Peter Schiff is CEO ofEuro Pacific Precious Metals, a gold and silver dealer selling reputable, well-known bullion coins and bars at competitive prices.
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As the global currency war intensifies, the majority of attention has been paid to the 17% fall of the Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar over the past few months. The implosion has given cover to the sad performance of another once mighty currency: the British pound sterling. But in many ways the travails of the pound is far more instructive to those pondering the fate of the U.S. currency.
Japan has a unique economic and demographic profile which makes it a poor stalking horse. Newly elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the Bank of Japan have clearly and forcefully committed Japan to a policy of inflation at any cost. Even in a world of serial money printers their plans stand out as exceptional. Britain, on the other hand, is charting a more conventional course to the same destination.
The UK government, under conservative Prime Minister David Cameron and Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, has succeeded in bringing marginal discipline to their budgetary imbalances. From 2009 to 2012, British government expenditures rose a total of just 1.6%, which was far below the official pace of inflation. (In contrast, U.S. federal spending grew by 7.9% over that time period). Since 2009 the British have kept their debt-to-GDP ratio lower than America's and have cut into that metric at a faster rate. But while the British are conservative when compared to their American cousins, they are hardly austere when compared to Germany (which continues to have a nearly balanced budget and extremely low debt to GDP). Paul Krugman blames Britain's lackluster economic performance on their misguided experiment with austerity.
The monetary side of the equation also puts the UK within the spectrum of its peers. Ever since the Great Recession began in 2008 the Bank of England, led by outgoing Governor Mervyn King, has been far more stimulative than the European Central Bankers in Frankfurt (but not quite as much as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of Japan). In contrast to the permanent and ongoing bond-buying quantitative easing programs underway in the U.S. and Japan, the Bank of England has engaged in such measures only selectively.
Given the relatively moderate approach pursued by the British, the poor performance of their currency may be hard to fathom. The deciding factor may be that the Pound Sterling is not nearly as vital to investors, or as integrated into the global economy, as the U.S. dollar or the euro. The greenback, being the world's reserve currency, has always benefited from demand that is independent of its economic fundamentals. The euro benefits from the size of the euro zone and the legacy of German banking discipline. The pound enjoys no such privileges and as a result foreign central banks do not feel as pressured to prop it up. As a result, over the past few years the pound has been... pounded. Since July 2010, the currency is down 26.7% against the U.S. dollar, and in recent months it has started falling faster than all other developed currencies except for the Abe-pummeled yen. Since October 1, 2012 the pound has fallen by 4% against the dollar and 8% against the euro.
The pound's health is made more suspect by the extreme challenges faced by the Bank of England as it tries to stimulate the most admittedly inflation prone economy among the major Western nations. Unlike the Federal Reserve, which is tasked by statute to combat both inflation and unemployment, the BofE has only a single mandate: to keep inflation contained. On that score it has been failing habitually. Inflation in the UK has been north of its 2% target for the past five years (the current official rate is 2.7%). In its most recent inflation projections, Mr. King admitted that it will stay that way for years to come, and that it may exceed 3% this year and next. With its currency weakening and inflation accelerating, the mandate of the BofE would clearly indicate that the time has come for monetary tightening.
However, like all central bankers, Mr. King, and his successor, the Canadian Mark Carney, will not be bound by such triflings as statutory mandates and past promises. In his press conference last week, Mr. King spoke of "looking past" current inflation figures to a time when he expects inflation will moderate. When the choice is between inflation and the political pain of economic contraction, bankers (at least those who don't speak German) will choose inflation every time.
While the American media has poked fun at the Bank of England's backtracking, they somehow do not understand that the Federal Reserve would be doing the same if not for the advantages given to us by the dollar's reserve status. Our ability to monetize the vast majority of the annual government deficit while exporting our inflation through half trillion dollar trade deficits and the overseas sale of hundreds of billions of Treasury bonds annually means that we do not yet face the pressures bearing down on the Bank of England.
For now at least Cameron is sticking to his guns and making the politically difficult case to voters that today's hard choices will yield benefits down the road. This puts all the pressure on the Bank of England to satisfy the calls for stimulus. The Federal Reserve is fortunate in that the Obama Administration shares none of Cameron's fiscal determination.
But already the Fed has done plenty of backing off from its prior promises. Just a few months ago Ben Bernanke announced specific inflation and unemployment triggers that would apparently put monetary policy on automatic pilot. But just last week, Fed Vice Chairman Janet Yellen announced that those goalposts (6.5% unemployment and 2.5% inflation) should not be considered "triggers" but as thresholds past which the Fed "may consider" tightening. When U.S. prices start to rise in earnest, look for the denials and rationalizations to come in torrents. The Fed will never acknowledge high inflation no matter what the data, nor will it ever take any steps to combat it. The simple reason is that it will be unable to do so without bringing on the economic contraction that is so terrifying to the British.
However, as British inflation accelerates, the pressure on the Bank of England to change course will intensify. As monetary stimulus continues to take its toll on the pound, price pressures will mount, even as the economy continues to stagnate. In other words, it is charting a course to stagflation. Perversely, this will put even more pressure on the BofE to ease. However, more cheap money will not stimulate the economy but merely cripple it further by fueling the inflationary fire.
At some point the British will have to admit that stimulus doesn't work. To break the inflationary spiral and rescue the ailing pound, the BofE will be forced to aggressively raise rates, at which point the British government will have no choice but to slash spending more deeply than would have been the case had they taken their medicine sooner. However, if the BofE refuses to tighten even in the face of much higher official inflation, the pound may deteriorate further and the UK might be left with the embarrassing choice of adopting the euro.
As far as the United States is concerned, the U.K. is the canary in the coal mine. What they are going through now, and what they may be about to go through, we will surely experience in the years ahead. The only difference is that the leeway afforded to us by our special status simply gives us more rope to hang ourselves. When the noose finally tightens, the fall will be that much more painful.
Peter Schiff is the CEO and Chief Global Strategist of Euro Pacific Capital, best-selling author and host of syndicated Peter Schiff Show.
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